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This note studies the allocation of heterogeneous commodities to agents whose private
values for combinations of these commodities are monotonic by inclusion. This setting
can accommodate the presence of complementarity and substitutability among the het-
erogeneous commodities. By using induction logic, we provide an elementary proof of
Holmstrom’s (1919) characterization of the Vickrey combinatorial auction as the unique
efficient, strategy-proof, and individually rational allocation rule. Our proof method can
also be applied to domains to which his proof cannot be.
1Serizawa greatly benefited from discussion with Rajat Deb.
1. Introduction
Recently, governments have increasingly been making use of auction mechanisms to
allocate state-owned assets which exhibit significant extent of complementarity or substi-
tutability. Examples of such assets include land, housing, spectrum rights (see, MacMil-
lan, 1994), electricity transmission (see McCabe, Rassenti, and Smith, 1991), railroad
tracks (Brewer and Plott, 1996), and space and time slots (Rassenti, Smith, and Bulfin,
1985; Banks, Ledyard, and Porter, 1989). The general problem concerns the allocation of
heterogeneous commodities to agents with private values for combinations of these com-
modities. In this regard, one auction mechanism that has received much attention is the
Vickrey combinatorial auction, which simultaneously allocates combinations of the com-
modities so that the total valuation is maximized for the reported bid profiles; and each
agent is required to pay the social opportunity cost of allocating to him the combination
of commodities he receives under the auction.2
An allocation rule is generally formulated as a function on the set of possible com-
modity value function profiles. Given an allocation rule, since agents’ private valuations
of commodities are not known to the others, there may be incentives for agents to misrep-
resent their values in order to manipulate the final outcomes to their favor. As a result,
the actual outcomes may not constitute an efficient allocation relative to agents’ true
values. Thus it is advantageous for a rule to be immune to such strategic mispresentation
and still attain an efficient allocation. If a rule is immune to strategic behavior by any
agent, that is, if it is a dominant strategy for each agent to announce his true commodity
values, then the rule is said to be strategy-proof. To attract a high number of agents, it
is desirable for an allocation rule to exhibit the property of individual rationality, i.e., by
never assigning any allocation which makes some agent worse off than he would be if he
receives no commodity and pays nothing. Thus it is important to know what allocation
rules are strategy-proof, individually rational, and efficient. It turns out that an answer
can be found in Holmstrom (1979). He studies allocation rules in public goods model.
His main results say that in public goods model, when the class of admissible preference
profiles is convex,3 an allocation rule is strategy-proof and maximizes the net total benefit
if and only if it is a Groves rule.4 In the case where the class of admissible preferences is
convex, his results can also be applied to auction models to conclude that an allocation
rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality is unique and can
be implemented by the Vickrey combinatorial auction.5
Many authors disscussed the importance of the above characterization of the Vick-
rey combinatorial auction.6 However, there exists economic situations where the classes
2This auction is described in Vickrey (1961) for multiple homogeneous commodities. It coincides with
the second-price auction when there is a single auction object. The Vickrey combinatorial auction is
essentially the same as the influential Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms proposed by Clarke (1971) and
Groves (1973). See Milgrom (2004) for the details.
3A class of preference profiles is “convex” if for any two value functions in the class of value functions,
any convex combination of the two functions also in the class.
4In fact, a milder assumption of “the smooth connectedness” of the class of admissible preference
profiles is sufficient.
5Similar characterizations for public good economies are previously established by Green and Laffont
(1977), and Walker (1978). However, the characterizations of the these two articles cannot be applied to
auction models since they assume that the class of admissible preferences include preferences which are
not admissible in auction models.
6See Milgrom (2004) for example.
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of admissible value function profiles are not convex, that is, the above characerization
cannnot be applied. By using mathematical induction, we prove the same conclusion on
non-convex classes of value function profiles. This new proof enables us to apply the char-
acterization to different situations. Besides, Holmstrom’s (1979) proof employs advanced
mathematical techniques. In view of the significance of Holmstrom’s results for the effi-
cient allocation of heterogenous commodities, it seems desirable to have a more accessible
and easily understandable proof. By using mathematical induction, we dispense with the
advanced mathematical techniques Holmstrom employs.
Section 2 sets up our model and states the main results formally. Section 3 contains
concluding remarks. Proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2. The Model and Main Results
We denote the set of agents byN = {1, 2, . . . , n} (n ≥ 2). There is a set of commodities
M = {1, 2, . . . ,m} (m ≤ n). Let M = 2M . A feasible commodity allocation A =
(A1, . . . , An) is a partition of the set of commodities; that is, Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ for any i ∈ N
and any j ∈ N with i 6= j, and ∪i∈NAi = M . We denote the set of feasible commodity
allocations by A.
We denote the money agent i pays by ti ∈ R+. A feasible allocation is a pair z =
(A; t) ∈ A×Rn+, where t = (t1, . . . , tn). We denote the set of feasible allocations by Z.
Agents have quasi-linear utility functions onM× R+. That is, each agent i has a value
function vi :M→ R+ on commodity combinations; when agent i receives Ai and pays
ti ∈ R+, his utility is ui(Ai, ti) = vi(Ai) − ti. We normalize valuation functions so that
vi(∅) = 0. We consider the following types of value functions.
Definition 1: (i) A value function vi is monotonic if vi(Ai) ≤ vi(Bi) for any Ai and
Bi with Ai ⊆ Bi;
(ii) it is strictly monotonic if vi(Ai) < vi(Bi) for any Ai and Bi with Ai Ã Bi;
(iii) it is additive if vi(Ai ∪ Bi) = vi(Ai) + vi(Bi) for any Ai ⊆ M and Bi ⊆ M with
Ai ∩Bi = ∅;
(iv) it is superadditive if vi(Ai ∪Bi) ≥ vi(Ai) + vi(Bi) for any Ai ⊆M and Bi ⊆M with
Ai ∩Bi = ∅;
(v) it is subadditive if vi(Ai ∪ Bi) ≤ vi(Ai) + vi(Bi) for any Ai ⊆ M and Bi ⊆ M with
Ai ∩Bi = ∅;
(vi) it exhibits homogeneity if vi(Ai) = vi(Bi) for any Ai ⊆ M and Bi ⊆ M with
#Ai = #Bi.
The conditions of subadditivity and superadditivity capture respectively the properties
of substitutability and complementarity. For a value function which exhibits homogene-
ity, being subadditive (resp: superadditive) is equivalent to having nonincreasing (resp:
nondecreasing) marginal utility. We denote the class of monotonic value functions by V im,
the class of strictly monotonic value functions by V ism, the class of monotonic and additive
value functions by V ia , and the class of strictly monotonic and additive value functions by
V isa.
Let V i denote the class of agent i’s admissible value functions, and V = V 1×· · ·×V n.
A value function profile is an element of V . We call V a class of value function profiles,
or a domain for short. Given N 0 ⊆ N , let V N 0 =
Q
j∈N 0 V
j. We denote generic elements
2
of V , V N
0
and V −i by v, vN
0
and v−i respectively. If v = (v1, . . . , vn) ∈ V , N 0 ⊆ N , and
i ∈ N are given in advance, vN 0 denotes (vj)j∈N 0 and v−i denotes (vj)j∈N\{i}.
Let Vm = V
1
m × · · · × V nm, Vsm = V 1sm × · · · × V nsm, Va = V 1a × · · · × V na , and Vsa =
V 1sa × · · · × V nsa.
Definition 2: Given a class V of value function profiles, an (allocation) rule on V
is a function f from V to Z.
Given a rule f : V → Z and v ∈ V , we denote agent i’s outcome commodity set by
f iA(v), and his outcome payment by f
i
t (v), and we write:
f(v) = (f1A(v), . . . , f
n
A(v); f
1
t (v), . . . , f
n
t (v)), f
i(v) = (f iA(v), f
i
t (v)), f
−i(u) = f(v)j 6=i.
Definition 3: A commodity allocation A ∈ A is efficient for v ∈ V ifX
i∈N
vi(A) = max{
X
i∈N
vi(B) : B ∈ A}.
An allocation z is efficient for v if its commodity allocation is efficient for v. A rule f is
efficient if for any v ∈ V , f(v) is efficient for v.
Definition 4: A rule f is strategy-proof if for any v ∈ V , any i ∈ N , and any vˆi ∈ V i,
ui(f i(v)) ≥ ui(f i(vˆi, v−i)).
Definition 5: A rule f : V → Z is individually rational if for any v ∈ V and any
i ∈ N ,
ui(f i(v)) ≥ ui(∅, 0) = vi(∅) = 0.
Definition 6: The Vickrey rule is a rule g such that for any v ∈ V,
gA(v) ∈ argmax{
X
i∈N
vi(B) : B ∈ A} (1)
and, git(v) = σ−i(v)− σ−i(v) for any i ∈ N, where
σ−i(v) =
X
j 6=i
vj(gjA(v)) and σ−i(v) = max{
X
j 6=i
vj(B) : B ∈ A}.
A Vickrey allocation rule is not unique, since the commodity allocation that maximizes
the total value in (1) may not be unique.
Remark 1: Let g and gˆ be Vickrey rules. Then
(i)
P
i∈N g
i
t(v) =
P
i∈N gˆ
i
t(v) for any v ∈ V .
(ii) ui(gi(v)) = ui(gˆi(v)) for any v ∈ V and any i ∈ N .
This remark follows since the efficiency of the Vickrey rules implies:X
i∈N
vi(git(v)) =
X
i∈N
vi(gˆit(v)), ∀v ∈ V .
In view of the above remark, we may treat a Vickrey allocation rule as if it is unique.
The Vickrey combinatorial auction is the direct mechanism for the Vickrey rule.7
7A mechanism is a pair consisting of an action space S and an outcome function h, where S =
S1 × · · · × Sn, Si is agent i’s action space, and h is a function from S to Z. The direct mechanism of an
allocation rule f on V is the mechanism (S, h) such that Si = V i for each i ∈ N , and h(v) = f(v) for all
v ∈ V .
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The following theorems characterize the Vickrey rule as the unique allocation rule
satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. By definition, the
Vickrey combinatorial auction implements it in dominant strategies.8
Definition 7 (Holmstrom 1979): A domain is V = V 1 × · · · × V n is smoothly
connected if for any i ∈ N , any v−i ∈ V −i, any vi ∈ V i, and any bvi ∈ V i, there exists a
one-dimensional parameterized family of valuation functions in V i :
V i(vi,bvi) = {vi(·; y) ∈ V i : y ∈ [0, 1]},
such that for all Ai,
(i) vi(Ai; 0) = vi(Ai), (ii) vi(Ai; 1) = bvi(Ai), (iii) ∀y ∈ [0, 1],∃∂vi(Ai; 1)∂y ,
and, moreover, for all y ∈ [0, 1] and all A = (Ai, A−i) ∈ A∗(vi,bvi; v−i), where
A∗(vi,bvi; v−i) = {A0 ∈ A : ∃y ∈ [0, 1] such thatX
i∈N
vi(Ai0) ∈ max{
X
i∈N
vi(B) : B ∈ A}},
we have
(iv) ∃K ∈ (0,∞) such that
¯¯¯¯
∂vi(Ai; 1)
∂y
¯¯¯¯
≤ K.
Definition 8: A domain is V = V 1×· · ·×V n is convex if for any i ∈ N , any vi ∈ V i,
any bvi ∈ V i, and any y ∈ [0, 1], y · vi + (1− y) · bvi ∈ V i.
Examples of convex domain are the class Vm of monotonic value functions, the class
Vsm of strictly monotonic value functions, the class Va of monotonic and additive value
functions, the class Vsa of strictly monotonic and additive value functions, the class of
monotonic and superadditive value functions, the class of monotonic and subadditive
value functions, etc. Holmstrom (1979) shows that the convexity of domain implies smooth
connectedness. Thus, the classes mentioned above are also smoothly connected. Theorem
1 below can be applied to those classes of value functions.
Theorem 1 (Holmstrom 1979): Let V be a smoothly connected domain. The
Vickrey rule is the unique allocation rule that is efficient, strategy-proof, and individually
rational on V .
Alothough Theorem 1 can be applied to various classes of value functions, there are
also exist economic situations to which Theoremem 1 cannot be applied. For example,
assume that bidders are firms who utilize the auctioned items to make profits. In this
case, value functions represent technology of utilizing the items. If no technology exists
in the industry that generates synergy effect among the items, and if no externality
exists among them, a natural domain of allocation rules is the clsss Va of additive value
functions. However, if there also exists a finite number of technologies v0k, k = 1, . . . ,K, in
the society that generate synergy effect among items, but whether a firm can access such
technologies or not is only known to the firm itself, then the domian is V = V 1a ∪{v0k : k =
1, . . . ,K} × · · · × V na ∪ {v0k : k = 1, . . . ,K}. This domain is not smoothly connected, and
8A mechanism (S, h) implements a rule f : V → Z in dominant strategies if there is a dominant strat-
egy si : V i → Si for each agent i ∈ N and h(s(v)) = f(v) for all v ∈ V , where s(v) = (s1(v1), ..., sn(vn)).
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so Holstrom’s result cannot be applied. However, our results, Theorems 2 and 3, below
can be applied.
Theorem 2: Let V be a domain such that Vsa ⊆ V ⊆ Vsm. The Vickrey rule is the
unique allocation rule that is efficient, strategy-proof, and individually rational on V .
Theorem 3: Let V be a domain such that Va ⊆ V ⊆ Vm. The Vickrey rule is the
unique allocation rule that is efficient, strategy-proof, and individually rational on V .
See Appendix for the proofs. In the appendix, we formally prove Theorem 2 only since
we can prove Theorem 3 similarly. We also show in Appendix that the conclusions of The-
orems 2 hold when we replace the class of strictly monotonic value functions respectively
by the other four classes of value functions in Definition 1: (ii) the class of strictly mono-
tonic and additively value functions, (iii) the class of strictly monotonic and superadditive
value functions, (iv) the class of strictly monotonic and subadditive value functions, and
(v) the class of strictly monotonic and value functions exhibiting homogeneity. In ad-
dition, we can show that these results apply to the class of value functions exhibiting
homogeneity and nonincreasing marginal utility. The idea of how to demonstrate the
conclusions on these classes of value functions is discussed in the Appendix.
3. Concluding Remarks
In this note, we provide an alternative proof of Holmstrom’s (1979) characterization of
the Vickrey combinatorial auction as the unique efficient, strategy-proof, and individually
rational allocation rule. While Holmstrom’s proof method employes real analysis, ours
employs induction logic. Moreover, our proof can be applied to nonconvex domains, to
which Holmstrom’s proof cannot be. Therefore, we have extended the situation in which
the characterization of the Vickrey combinatorial auction holds.
Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2: Efficiency and individual rationality of the Vickrey rule follow di-
rectly from its definition. The usual argument implies that the Vickrey rule is strategy-
proof as well.
It remains to establish the uniqueness of a strategy-proof, efficient, and individually
rational rule on the class of strictly monotonic value functions. Let f be a rule that is
strategy-proof, efficient, and individually rational on V . We prove that f is the Vickrey
rule. It follows directly from efficiency that
fA(v) ∈ argmax{
X
i∈N
vi(Bi) : B ∈ A}
for any v ∈ V . It suffices to prove f it (v) = σ−i(v)− σ−i(v) for any i ∈ N and any v ∈ V .
Given Ai ⊆M, we denote
σ¯−i(v;Ai) = max{
X
j 6=i
vj(Bi) : B ∈ A and Bi = Ai}.
We employ the following facts.
5
Fact 1 : For any v ∈ V and any i ∈ N, f it (v) ≤ vi(f iA(v)).
Fact 2: For any v ∈ V , any i ∈ N , and any vˆi ∈ V i, if f iA(vˆi, v−i) = f iA(v), then
f it (vˆ
i, v−i) = f it (v).
Fact 3: For any v ∈ V , any i ∈ N , and any A ∈ A, if Ai = f iA(v),X
j 6=i
vj(Aj) ≤ σ¯−i(v;Ai) = σ−i(v).
Fact 1 follows from individual rationality. Fact 2 follows from strategy-proofness. In
Fact 3, the inequality follows from the definition of σ¯−i(v;Ai) and the equality follows
from efficiency.
Let v ∈ V and i ∈ N . We shall show by induction on the cardinality #f iA(v) of f iA(v)
that f it (v) = σ−i(v)− σ−i(v). When #f iA(v) = 0, Fact 1 implies f it (v) = git(v) = 0. Thus,
we start with the case of #f iA(v) = 1.
STEP 1: Assume that #f iA(v) = 1. Without loss of generality, let f
i
A(v) = {1}.
Suppose f it (v) 6= σ−i(v)−σ−i(v). We derive a contradiction in each of the following three
cases.
Case 1: f it (v) > v
i(f iA(v)). This contradicts Fact 1.
Case 2: f it (v) < σ−i(v)− σ−i(v). Let vˆi ∈ V isa be such that
f it (v) < vˆ
i({1}) < σ−i(v)− σ−i(v), (2)
and
vˆi({k}) < min
j 6=i
min
Aj⊆M\{k}
{vj(Aj ∪ {k})− vj(Aj)}, ∀k 6= 1. (3)
We show f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = ∅. Together with (3), efficiency implies that k /∈ f iA(vˆi, v−i) for
any k 6= 1. Thus, f iA(vˆi, v−i) equals ∅ or {1}. For any A ∈ A, if Ai = {1}, then since Fact
3 implies
P
j 6=i v
j(Aj) ≤ σ−i(v), it follows from the RHS of (2) that
vˆi(Ai) +
X
j 6=i
vj(Aj) ≤ vˆi({1}) + σ−i(v) < σ−i(v).
Thus, any commodity allocation A with Ai = {1} is not efficient for (vˆi, v−i). Therefore,
efficiency implies that fA(vˆi, v−i) = ∅.
Fact 1, in conjunction with fA(vˆ
i, v−i) = ∅, implies that ft(vˆi, v−i) = 0. It follows
from the LHS of (2) that
uˆi(f i(v)) = vˆi({1})− f it (v) > 0 = uˆi(f i(vˆi, v−i)).
This contradicts strategy-proofness.
Case 3: σ−i(v)− σ−i(v) < f it (v) ≤ vi(f iA(v)). Let vˆi ∈ V isa be such that
σ−i(v)− σ−i(v) < vˆi({1}) < f it (v), (4)
and
vˆi({k}) < min
j 6=i
min
Aj⊆M\{k}
{vj(Aj ∪ {k})− vj(Aj)}, ∀k 6= 1. (5)
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We show f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = {1}. Together with (5), efficiency implies that k /∈ f iA(vˆi, v−i)
for any k 6= 1. Thus, f iA(vˆi, v−i) equals ∅ or {1}. For any A ∈ A, if Ai = ∅, then it follows
from the LHS of (4) that
vˆi(Ai) +
X
j 6=i
vj(Aj) =≤ σ−i(v) < vˆi({1}) + σ−i(v) = vˆi(f iA(v)) +
X
j 6=i
vj(f jA(v)).
Thus, any commodity allocation A with Ai = ∅ is not efficient for (vˆi, v−i). Therefore,
efficiency implies f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = {1}.
Fact 2, in conjunction with f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = {1} and the RHS of (4), implies that
f it (vˆ
i, v−i) = f it (v) > vˆ
i(f iA(vˆ
i, v−i)).
This contradicts Fact 1.
STEP 2: Let m0 ≤ m. As induction hypothesis, assume that if #f iA(v) ≤ m0 − 1,
then f it (v) = σ−i(v)−σ−i(v). We show that if #f iA(v) = m0, then f it (v) = σ−i(v)−σ−i(v).
Without loss of generality, let f iA(v) = {1, . . . ,m0}. Then Fact 3 implies thatX
j 6=i
vj(Aj) ≤ σ−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0}) = σ−i(v), ∀A ∈ A Ä Ai = {1, . . . ,m0}. (6)
Suppose f it (v) 6= σ−i(v)− σ−i(v). We derive a contradiction in each of the following two
cases.
Case 1: f it (v) < σ−i(v)− σ−i(v). Note
f it (v) + σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1})− σ−i(v) < σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1})− σ−i(v).
Let vˆi ∈ V isa be such that
f it (v) + σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0− 1})− σ−i(v) < vˆi(m0) < σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0− 1})− σ−i(v), (7)
vˆi({k}) > σ−i(v), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}, (8)
and
vˆi({k}) < min
j 6=i
min
Aj⊆M\{k}
{vj(Aj ∪ {k})− vj(Aj)}, ∀k /∈ {1, . . . ,m0}. (9)
We show here that f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = {1, . . . ,m0− 1}. Together with (9), efficiency implies
that k /∈ f iA(vˆi, v−i) for any k /∈ {1, . . . ,m0}, so that f iA(vˆi, v−i) ⊆ {1, . . . ,m0}. Together
with (8), efficiency also implies k ∈ f iA(vˆi, v−i) for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}. Thus,
f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) equals {1, . . . ,m0−1} or {1, . . . ,m0}. Moreover, for any A ∈ A, it follows from
(6), the RHS of (7), and vˆi ∈ V isa that if Ai = {1, . . . ,m0}, then
vˆi(Ai) +
X
j 6=i
vj(Aj) ≤
m0X
k=1
vˆi({k}) + σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0})
<
m0−1X
k=1
vˆi({k}) + σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}).
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Thus, any commodity allocation A with Ai = {1, . . . ,m0} is not efficient for (vˆi, v−i).
Therefore, efficiency implies that f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}.
The induction hypothesis, in conjunction with f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = {1, . . . ,m0 − 1} implies
that
uˆi(f i(vˆi, v−i)) =
m0−1X
k=1
vˆi({k})− [σ−i(v)− σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1})].
On the other hand, it follows from the LHS of (7) that
uˆi(f i(v)) >
m0−1X
k=1
vˆi({k})− [σ−i(v)− σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1})] = uˆi(f i(vˆi, v−i)).
This contradicts strategy-proofness.
Case 2: f it (v) > σ−i(v)− σ−i(v). Note
f it (v) + σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1})− σ−i(v) > σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1})− σ−i(v).
Let vˆi ∈ V isa be such that
f it (v)+σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0−1})−σ−i(v) > vˆi({m0}) > σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0−1})−σ−i(v), (10)
vˆi({k}) > σ−i(v),∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}, (11)
and,
vˆi({k}) < min
j 6=i
min
Aj⊆M\{k}
{vj(Aj ∪ {k})− vj(Aj)},∀k /∈ {1, . . . ,m0}. (12)
We show here that f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = {1, . . . ,m0}. Together with (12), efficiency implies
that k /∈ f iA(vˆi, v−i) for any k /∈ {1, . . . ,m0}, so that f iA(vˆi, v−i) ⊆ {1, . . . ,m0}. Together
with (11), efficiency also implies that k ∈ f iA(vˆi, v−i) for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}. Thus,
f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) equals {1, . . . ,m0−1} or {1, . . . ,m0}. Moreover, for any A ∈ A, it follows from
(6), the RHS of (10), and vˆi ∈ V isa that if Ai = {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}, then
vˆi(Ai) +
X
j 6=i
vj(Aj) ≤
m0−1X
k=1
vˆi({k}) + σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1})
<
m0X
k=1
vˆi({k}) + σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0}).
Thus, any commodity allocation A with Ai = {1, . . . ,m0 − 1} is not efficient for (vˆi, v−i).
Therefore, efficiency implies that f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = {1, . . . ,m0}.
Fact 2, in conjunction with f iA(vˆ
i, v−i) = {1, . . . ,m0} implies that f it (vˆi, v−i) = f it (v).
Therefore,
uˆi(f i(vˆi, v−i)) =
m0X
k=1
vˆi({k})− f it (v).
Let evi ∈ V isa be such that
evi({k}) > σ−i(v), ∀k ∈ {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}, (13)
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and evi({k}) < min
j 6=i
min
Aj⊆M\{k}
{vj(Aj ∪ {k})− vj(Aj)}, ∀k /∈ {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}. (14)
Then together with (14), efficiency implies that k /∈ f iA(evi, v−i) for any k /∈ {1, . . . ,m0−1},
so that f iA(evi, v−i) ⊆ {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}. Together with (13), efficiency also implies that
k ∈ f iA(evi, v−i) for any k ∈ {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}. Thus, f iA(evi, v−i) = {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}, so that
f it (evi, v−i) = σ−i(v)− σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1}),
by the induction hypothesis. It follows from the LHS of (10) and vˆi ∈ V isa that
uˆi(f i(evi, v−i)) = m0−1X
k=1
vˆi({k})− [σ−i(v)− σ¯−i(v; {1, . . . ,m0 − 1})]
>
m0−1X
k=1
vˆi({k})− [(f it (v)− vˆi(m0)]
=
m0X
k=1
vˆi({k})− f it (v)
= uˆi(f i(vˆi, v−i)).
This contradicts strategy-proofness.
We have established the uniqueness of the strategy-proof, efficient, and individually
rational allocation rule on the class of strictly monotonic value functions. ¥
Here, we show how the result of Theorem 2 can be proved on the class of strictly
monotonic and additive value functions (denoted by Vsa), the class of strictly monotonic
and subadditive value functions (denoted by Vsb), the class of strictly monotonic and
superadditive value functions (denoted by Vsp), the class of strictly monotonic value func-
tions exhibiting homogeneity (denoted by Vsh), and the class of strictly monotonic value
functions exhibiting homogeneity with nonincreasing marginal utility (denoted by Vsd).
Note that Facts 1, 2, and 3 hold on these five classes of value functions. In the proof of
Theorem 2, besides the original value profile v being selected from Vsm, we use candidate
value functions vˆi and evi from Vsa, to derive contradictions in Cases 2 and 3 of Step 1 and
Cases 1 and 2 of Step 2. It is apparent that the above method of proof can be applied to
demonstrate the uniqueness on Vsa, Vsb, and Vsp, each of which contains Vsa. For Vsh, and
Vsd, the present method of proof applies with slight modifications. That is, in deriving
the contradictions in Cases 2 and 3 of Step 1 and Cases 1 and 2 of Step 2, we can choose
the candidate value functions vˆi and evi from Vsh and Vsd, respectively.
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